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Central banking in a regional economic setting:  
Possible contributions to integration 
Gregor Heinrich* 
Abstract: Central banks can play an important role in facilitating and promoting regional 
economic and monetary integration. Examples are the European monetary union and a 
more recent initiative by a group of Asian central banks to boost liquidity in local bond 
markets in Asia through the “Asian Bond Fund 2”. This paper highlights the role of 
central banks in these efforts and points to issues that could be of relevance for the 
ongoing integration process in the Caribbean. It argues that the creation of a single 
currency area was based on a lengthy process, that economic integration came before 
monetary union, and that it required a strong degree of political determination; 
furthermore, integration is also assisted by the building of institutions and ongoing 
cooperation and dialogue among relevant authorities. 
Introduction 
Countries in the Caribbean have been working for many decades at embracing the 
challenges of an increasingly globalised world, including liberalised financial flows, the 
growth of offshore banking, foreign direct investment, migration of labour away from the 
region, and increased remittances to the region. One of the responses to those 
challenges has been efforts at increased regional cooperation and integration. Another 
response is increased interaction with, and contribution to, global efforts of cooperation 
and coordination, not the least in the world of central banking and banking supervision.1 
The 35th Anniversary of the Central Bank of Barbados provides an opportunity for some 
reflection on the information that is available on some of the Caribbean economies, 
efforts towards integration and examples of central bank contributions towards regional 
integration in other parts of the world. 
                                                
* Chief Representative, Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Representative Office for the Americas, 
Mexico City (Gregor.c.heinrich@bis.org). The article is based on a presentation at the 35th Anniversary 
Conference, Central Bank of Barbados, 10 May 2007; it represents the personal views of the author 
and not necessarily those of the BIS. I am grateful to Rodrigo Mora, Research Assistant in the 
Americas Office for the preparation of graphs, and to Már Gudmundsson, Deputy Head of the 
Monetary and Economic Department at the BIS, Michela Scatigna, Bruno Tissot and Camilo Tovar for 
helpful comments. 
1  For instance, as part of the Offshore Group of Bank Supervisors, the Central Bank of Barbados works 
closely with the Basel Committee on Baking Supervision (BCBS) and has hosted a conference on the 
new Capital Adequacy Framework of the Basel Committee, known as “Basel II”, in July 2006. The 
Central Bank is also part of ASBA (www.asba-supervision.org), the Association of Bank Supervisors of 
the Americas, and of CEMLA (www.cemla.org), an entity owned by central banks in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. 
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Barbados in BIS publications 
Barbados is mentioned in over ten BIS Annual Reports, the first time 1947 (in relation to 
“currencies of non-metropolitan areas”), then in 1973, when Barbados was among the 
group of countries that chose to float with the Sterling, a decision, by the way, that was 
shared in the Caribbean by Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago. It could actually be 
interesting for a historian to look back and see whether that decision was taken on the 
basis of regional consultations or by each central bank individually. 
A further mention of Barbados came in connection with the growth of euro-currency 
markets in the 70s, and the BIS Annual Report of 1976 mentions Barbados among the 
offshore centres that were both the source as well as users of Euro-currency funds.  
A very different type of publication is the BIS Review that contains speeches by central 
bank Governors. Governor Williams, who has attended several BIS meetings, has also 
contributed on numerous occasions to that publication.2 
A further source of information that one can consult in order to find out about on the 
financial positions of Barbados as well as other countries in the Caribbean and of many 
other countries around the world are the very extensive BIS International Financial 
Statistics3. 
Caribbean facts 
These statistics collected by central banks in reporting countries and processed by the 
BIS allow for interesting comparisons relating to capital flows, developments of financial 
markets and other information of interest to central banks. They can be of particular 
interest in a regional economic setting, and this of course includes CARICOM. 
In 1972, the same year that the Central Bank of Barbados was born, Commonwealth 
Caribbean decided to transform the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) into a 
Common Market and establish the Caribbean Community, of which the Common Market 
                                                
2  For instance: “Foreign exchange reserves - how much is enough?”, BIS Review 12/2006; January 
2006; “The development of the Caribbean capital market”, BIS Review, 32/2004; “What is in store for 
the Barbadian economy as we enter the CSME”, BIS Review 20/2005; all at www.bis.org/review. 
3  The locational banking statistics gather quarterly data on international financial claims and liabilities of 
bank offices in the reporting countries. Total positions are broken down by currency, by sector (bank 
and non-bank), by country of residence of the counterparty and by nationality of reporting banks. 
Worldwide consolidated data are reported on a contractual (immediate borrower) basis by banks' head 
offices in 30 reporting countries. These data exclude banks' cross-border inter-office business 
contained in the locational data, but include additionally local claims in foreign currency of all their 
foreign branches and subsidiaries. For more information, see 
http://www.bis.org/statistics/about_banking_stats.htm, and McGuire and Wooldridge (2005). 
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would be an integral part.4 The Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community, as you all 
know, was signed on 4 July 1973. 
Among the objectives of the Community, identified in Article 6 of the Revised Treaty, are 
accelerated, coordinated and sustained economic development and convergence. 
The Heads of Government of CARICOM countries have expressed their determination 
to work toward establishing a single market and economy. According to CARICOM, the 
proper functioning of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) also requires, 
amongst others, economic policy measures, such as coordination and convergence of 
macroeconomic policies5 and performance, and monetary policy measures, such as 
coordinating exchange rate and interest rate policies, as well as the commercial banking 
market. 
It is in this context that central banks are called upon to play their unique role of 
managing monetary policy and overseeing financial stability.  
The objectives of the Central Bank of Barbados show parallels with the overall goals of 
CARICOM, as they consist of promoting monetary stability and a sound financial 
structure, fostering development of the money and capital markets, channelling 
commercial bank credit into productive activities, and fostering credit and exchange 
conditions conducive to the orderly and sustained economic development of Barbados.6 
Other central banks in the region have very similar objectives, but they have to operate 
under economic scenarios that are at times quite different.  
First, the following data, derived from the International Financial Statistics, referred to 
above, show differences and commonalities between selected countries in the 
Caribbean.7 
a) Let us look, for instance, at the maturity distribution of consolidated claims of BIS 
reporting banks on the Caribbean, and Latin America. We know that countries in general 
attempt to avoid needing to face high debt repayments in the short termwhich could lead 
to a liquidity crunch. Countries which succeed in lengthening the maturity of their debt, 
so that the proportion of short-term vs. long-term debt shifts away from short-term debt, 
gain in external stability and confidence of financial market participants.  
                                                
4   See http://www.caricom.org. 
5  On this point in particular, see Bourne (2006). 
6  See http://www.centralbank.org.bb. 
7  As the statistics capture merely banking data, they do not necessarily provide a full picture of 
exposures. For instance, holdings by foreigners of domestic bonds would not be captured by the data. 
Furthermore, while trends might be similar, the actual amounts in question can differ considerably. 
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A closer look at the individual countries in the region (Graph 1) points out some 
interesting differences. Offshore centres in general have managed to reduce such 
vulnerability considerably as compared to 15 years ago, but the short-term component is 
still the most important and remains pronounced in, for instance, Barbados or St Vincent 
and the Grenadines. We can also see that most progress was made in the last decade, 
and that for the last 6 years, the overall maturity distribution remained almost 
unchanged, the allocation being almost equally split between short- and long-term 
claims. 
b) As Caribbean countries are increasingly integrated into the global financial system, 
another interesting observation results from looking at the respective shares of banks, 
the public sector, and the non-bank private sector in obtaining credit from foreign 
institutions. Taking as a source the consolidated positions from institutions based in 
reporting countries (Graph 2), we note for all of the Caribbean and Latin America a 
gradual decrease of the exposure of the public sector, and a strong increase in the 
exposure of foreign banks to the non-banking private sector. This trend is echoed in 
most Caribbean countries, both the larger ones and the smaller countries. 
In Jamaica, Dominica, and Grenada, we see rising amounts of claims on the public 
sector, while in the small island economies, lending to the banking or public sectors is 
practically non-existent. Interbank lending activity remains important in Barbados and to 
a certain extent in Jamaica. In the offshore centres it still accounts for a large part of the 
total claims, but as of 1998, claims on the non-bank private sector have risen sharply, 
reaching over $1 trillion in 2006.  
The acceleration of lending to the non-banking private sector that has been observed in 
some countries since around 2005 could be attributed to increasing hedge fund activity 
out of Caribbean states,8  but could perhaps also be attributed to the real-estate boom 
that some are experiencing at the moment. 
c) A further interesting observation concerns the creation of local financial markets. One 
obvious way to reduce the vulnerability to external financing is the development of a 
domestic credit market. As we can see in Graph 3, the percentage of local claims as 
compared to foreign claims has increased in the last 10 years. Again, we can see that 
many, but not all Caribbean countries are in line with this trend. Offshore centres, where 
international claims remain the main type of lending, appear to be an obvious exception. 
In fact, BIS reporting banks’ foreign claims on the Caribbean and Latin America tripled in 
less than two decades. Of these, claims on local residents (denominated in local 
                                                
8  In fact, the scale of non-bank private sector borrowing in offshore centres is often seen as a trend 
indicator of hedge fund activity, which fluctuates according to opportunities in “carry trades”, for 
instance, borrowing Japanese yen or Swiss francs at low interest rates from the banks (thus boosting 
their “international” claims) and lending these funds to the markets with higher interest rates (such as 
Brazil). 
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currency and booked by reporting banks’ affiliates) grew from less than 10% to more 
than 150% over the same number of years. 
Second, Caribbean countries do not all use the same or similar exchange rate regimes 
and monetary policy instruments, an observation that is also true for the Central 
American region. (Table 1). 
Third, as Governor Ewart Williams of the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago recently 
noted, the story of the Caribbean as a whole is that of steadily declining growth in per 
capita GDP, from 3.9% in the 1970s to 2.2% in the 1980s and to 1.9% in the 1990s. This 
would be a further reason why the region sees the implementation of the Caribbean 
Single Market Economy (CSME) by 2009 as an essential element of any strategy to 
further the development of the regional economies.9 
Examples of central bank contributions to regional integration 
There are certainly many aspects to how central banks can contribute to regional 
integration.  
I shall briefly mention two quite different examples. First, the creation of monetary union, 
ie the creation and management of a common currency, and second, a fairly recent 
example set by Asian central banks to foster the development and deepening of local 
bond markets through the Asian bond fund initiative. 10 
1) Monetary Union 
The most challenging is certainly the creation of a monetary union, the creation of a new 
currency area with a central bank that covers several countries, most often with formerly 
independent currencies, monetary policies and separate monetary authorities or central 
banks.11 Central banks of the region have been examining the issue of Caribbean 
monetary union since the early 1990s, triggered to some extent by a concern about the 
European move towards a single European market and the formation of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),12 formally launched in January 1994.13 
                                                
9  Willams (2007). 
10  Other examples of central bank’s contributions to regional integration are perhaps less evident or less 
well known. One example is the Central American Monetary Council, the hub for cooperation among 
central banks from Central America and the Dominican Republic, with its central secretariat based in 
Costa Rica. One of the Council’s more recent initiatives, though not yet finalised, is the creation of a 
joint payment systems network, based on common general legal principles that are to become law in 
very member country. See http://www.secmca.org/Proyectos_SistemaPagos.htm. 
11  On the challenges, benefits and risks related to currency areas  and exchange rate regimes, see Artus 
et.al. (2005), with, in particular Hawkins and Klau (2005) and Manioc and Montauban (2005) 
12  CARICOM agreed in 1992 that its eight members that were not part of the ECCB area (Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago should join it to form a 
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The most evident example in this region is the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union 
(ECCU), with the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, established in 1983, managing a 
common currency for practically all members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States (OECS).14 
On a larger scale, the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) as part of the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and a new common currency, the euro, was 
certainly an enormous challenge. 
As regards monetary unions, I cannot speak for the ECCB or the ECB, but allow me to 
briefly comment on the European experience. 
The monetary integration process at European level was neither easy nor fully accepted 
by all from the outset. The successful introduction of the euro also did not occur by 
accident. Rather it was the result of a long and painstaking preparatory process.  
This process started under the aegis of the Committee of EC Central Bank Governors, 
and it started in Basel at the BIS, as it was there where the Committee had its 
Secretariat. The Committee of Governors was central to the preparation of the Statute of 
the ESCB and the Maastricht Treaty15 and, after the signing of the Treaty, undertook the 
initial groundwork for the move to monetary union. After its creation in 1994, the 
European Monetary Institute (EMI), as the institutional precursor to the ECB foreseen in 
the Treaty, took over the preparatory work. These preparations drew on the 
accumulated experience of central banks throughout the world, but - of course - 
especially those in the euro area.16 
European monetary cooperation in a broader sense began with the establishment of the 
European Payments Union (EPU) in 195017, well before the emergence of the Common 
Market and of the European Community.18 The beginning of the practical process 
towards monetary union, however, goes back to the Hague Summit in 1969 when the 
heads of state or of government "agreed that on the basis of the memorandum 
presented by the Commission on 12 February 1969 and in close collaboration with the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Caribbean wide single currency. Farrell (1995). On the desirability and feasibility of NAFTA as a 
common currency area, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). 
13  On NAFTA, see http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org. 
14  Liburd (1995), Randall, Rosales, et al. (2000). On the OECS see http://www.oecs.org. 
15  The Maastricht Treaty, formally the “Treaty of European Union”, was signed 7 February 1992; 
http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html.  
16  Duisenberg (2000). 
17  On the EPU see Kaplan and Schleiminger (1989) , and, on the role of the BIS in EPU in particular,  
Toniolo (2005). 
18  Lamfalussy (2005). 
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Commission a plan by stages should be drawn up by the Council during 1970 with a 
view to the creation of an Economic and Monetary Union".19  
It is important to bear in mind that monetary union would probably not have been 
possible without a) a well defined process b) a central hub, in which all formerly 
independent central banks participate, and c) a common interbank payment system that 
enables financial institutions to have access to the same central bank money. 
Initially, there was quite some scepticism towards European monetary integration, at 
least from countries with strong currencies and highly reputed central banks, although 
over time a general attitude of “constructive scepticism” emerged. One former central 
banker from the Bundesbank even said that it would have been considered heresy if 
anyone in that institution had predicted that within 20 years the beloved D-Mark would 
be replaced by the euro.20 
It is worth noting the role of central banks in the unification process. The political leaders 
entrusted the central bankers right from the beginning with a major role in the 
preparation of the Maastricht Treaty, for instance when they decided to set up the Delors 
Committee which was made up to a large extent by eminent central bankers.21 It was 
also decided that the majority of the meetings, and practically all the preparatory work 
for the meetings, would take place at the BIS, with both rapporteurs being central 
bankers.22  
While the Maastricht Treaty left open a number of issues, it was quite clear on two 
subjects that could have created serious conflicts between governments and the central 
bankers. The independence of the ECB was well defined; and so were the convergence 
criteria for accession to EMU. Among these criteria the fiscal ones, and naturally the 
inflation criterion, were of crucial importance for avoiding major conflicts between 
governments and the central banks on the road to monetary union. 
The institution-building process, too, was governed by the Maastricht Treaty23. It set out 
a roadmap in great detail, described reasonably clearly what should be the division of 
labour between the Council, the Commission and the central bankers of the EMI and of 
                                                
19  On the history of the euro, see for instance http://ec.europa.eu/ economy_finance/ euro/origins/ 
origins_2_en.htm, and www.dip-badajoz.es/eurolocal/entxt/emu/antecedentes/chaya.htm. 
20  Pleines (2007). 
21  Most notably the and the Governor of the Bank of England, Robert Leigh-Pemberton, and the 
Governor of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Karl Otto Pöhl. 
22  On interesting questions of governance in policy making in the EU, from cooperation, over “competition 
and negotiation”, to “competition and hierarchy” in the runup to European monetary union, to today´s 
“negotiation, competition  and coordination”, see Verdun and Monnet Chair (2006). 
23  Supra, at note 15. 
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the ECB, and, most important, set 1 January 1999 as the latest date on which the single 
monetary policy should start operating. 
The European Monetary Institute, which, as noted above, had been put in charge of 
setting up the ECB, defining the operational infrastructure of the single monetary policy 
and preparing the future monetary policy strategy, was initially located at the BIS in 
Basel and then moved to Frankfurt where it developed into the ECB. 
As regards infrastructure, European monetary union would not have worked without a 
joint payment system, TARGET24, and a collateral arrangement25, that allowed for 
settlements in central bank money which in turn is an essential element for effective 
monetary policy implementation. 
In a way TARGET as a common payment systems platform is a working example that 
true integration is only possible with standard frameworks within which those 
participating in the system in their respective enterprises can interact, with standard 
procedural components, with standard specifications and with basic technical conditions: 
in short, standards on whose application the participants are in agreement or which they 
are committed to use.26 
 
Some of the experiences from the European monetary integration process could very 
well apply also to other regions such as the Caribbean. First, the process was a lengthy 
one; second, economic integration, that is trade and free movement of capital as well as 
capital account liberalisation, came before monetary union; and third, it required a strong 
degree of political determination.27  
                                                
24  TARGET = Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system. On 
functional details, regulatory basis and statistics of usage, see the ECB's “Blue Book” at 
http://www.ecb.int/paym/market/blue/html/index.en.html.  TARGET 2, the “next generation” of the 
system,will go live on 19 November 2007. Furthermore, the ECB and ESCB are working on 
“TARGET2-Securities”, an IT service for settling securities; 
www.ecb.int/paym/market/secmar/integr/html/index.en.html and www.ecb.int/ecb/cons/html/t2s.en.html 
25  CCBM=Correspondent central banking model; 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/1003/107597/html/index.en.html, and, 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/1003/107597/html/index.en.html. On consultations for a new common 
platform for  CCBM, www.ecb.int/ecb/cons/html/t2securities.en.html. 
26  Hartmann (1998) 
27  See also Noyer (2007).. 
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2) Joint furthering of capital markets: The Asian Bond Fund initiative28 
While a monetary union on the basis of common policy criteria seeks to improve 
monetary stability and obtain benefits from removing foreign exchange risk within the 
area of the union, a different set of benefits can be obtained from developing financial 
markets and increasing liquidity in domestic bond markets.  
Such a goal can be well in the interest of central banks. And they an even be part of the 
general mission statement of a central bank, as the example of the Central Bank of 
Barbados shows.29  
An example for coordinated efforts towards better functioning financial markets, coming 
from a different part of the world is the recent initiative by Asian central to boost liquidity 
in local bond markets in Asia, the “Asian Bond Fund 2” (ABF2) initiative.   
The background to the coordinated effort in Asia was the following. Despite a rapid 
expansion of markets in Asia over the last decade, there were indications that Asians 
have largely been investing part of their high savings in low-yielding foreign financial 
assets in developed countries abroad. Investments in Asia from abroad, in the form of 
bank lending and portfolio inflows, tended, however, to be volatile. In order to develop a 
source of long- term borrowing for Asian borrowers, Asian policymakers have responded 
by launching a number of cooperative initiatives, but perhaps the most intriguing is the 
ABF2, a regional fund for which the BIS has been appointed administrator.30  
This regional fund was established by the 11 monetary authorities of the Executives’ 
Meeting of the East Asia and Pacific group1 (or EMEAP as it is better known).31 In less 
than two years, this venture has identified – and in many cases addressed - myriad 
impediments to trading in local bond markets. Most importantly, under the ABF2 
initiative, EMEAP central banks provided the seed money from their international 
reserves to purchase certain funds. 
                                                
28  This section relies to a large extent on: “Report of the EMEAP Working Group on Financial Markets: 
Review of the Asian Bond Fund 2 Initiative”, June 2006, http:///www.emeap.org, and Knight (2006); 
information on the PAIF and ABF is also available from http://www.abf-paif.com. 
29  Supra, note at note 6. 
30  Furthermore, EMEAP investments in the ABF2 are held through a BIS investment vehicle the USD 
denominated BIS Investment Pool (BISIP). As such, the BIS monitors the performance of the nine 
underlying funds, compiles monthly reports, and rebalances the allocation of funds to the nine funds. It 
is also responsible for implementing procedures for implementing for transition of EMEAP investments 
from phase one (funds for EMEAP only) to Phase 2 (funds open to the public, subject to regulatory 
requirements), and preparation of the annual report and audited financial statements. 
31  The 11 EMEAP central banks and monetary authorities are the Reserve Bank of Australia, People’s 
Bank of China, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Bank Indonesia, Bank of Japan, Bank of Korea, Bank 
Negara Malaysia, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Monetary Authority of 
Singapore and Bank of Thailand 
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ABF2 actually consists of nine separate funds: a Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF) 
that invests in sovereign and quasi-sovereign domestic currency bonds in eight EMEAP 
bond markets; and eight Single-market funds each investing in the same bonds of the 
respective markets (Chart 1). These nine local currency-domestic bond funds, which are 
managed by private sector managers, replicate specific bond benchmarks provided by a 
third party.  
EMEAP agreed to invest a total of USD 2 bn in the ABF2, with USD 1 bn being allocated 
to the PAIF and USD 1 bn distributed among the eight Single-market Funds. Although 
investments in ABF2 were initially confined to placements of official international 
reserves by the 11 EMEAP founders, the Fund is now being opened up to other 
institutional and retail investors. 
Chart 1 
 
The PAIF targets primarily regional and international investors who want to invest in the 
eight Asian bond markets through a single product. The Single-market Funds are 
intended to provide local retail investors a convenient way to invest in a portfolio of local 
bonds and, at the same time, to give regional and international investors the flexibility to 
invest in individual Asian bond markets of their own choice. 
One could say that the ABF2 is also a commercial success. The launching of public 
bond funds in Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines, in addition to the four individual 
market funds launched last year, helped to bring the overall size of the ABF2 to $3.1 
billion at end-March 2007. Approximately $800 million of private investment now 
complements the investment by central banks, which has grown from $2 billion to $2.3 
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billion. The PAIF returned about 17% in its first 21 months of operation, ending in March 
2007. 
Despite its relatively modest size in the Asian perspective, ABF2 has proven to be 
unusually effective in promoting reform efforts within domestic bond markets. By 
bringing together officials from the EMEAP countries to discuss the practicalities of 
actually establishing these bond funds, the ABF initiative has helped to improve their 
understanding of idiosyncrasies in their own domestic markets and to identify in detail 
significant market impediments. In general, it has highlighted the importance of 
standardisation of issues and the perils of segmentation. More specifically, ABF2 has 
prompted various countries to liberalise their capital control regimes. 32 
ABF2 has also fostered a better understanding among participants of each other’s 
regulatory framework, enabling a fund domiciled in one jurisdiction to be sold in another. 
For example, the Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund is domiciled in Singapore where it can 
take advantage of a variety of bilateral tax agreements between Singapore and other 
EMEAP members. Yet it has been initially listed in Hong Kong in recognition of the 
greater liquidity available in that market.  
A particularly innovative aspect of ABF2 is a mechanism that helps to provide incentives 
for EMEAP countries to reduce market impediments in their jurisdictions. In determining 
the portfolio allocations within the PAIF among the eight EMEAP markets, a significant 
weighting is given to “market openness”, which takes account of the extent to which 
capital controls and withholding taxes are still in place, the availability of hedging 
instruments and the effectiveness of clearing and settlement systems. Starting from an 
equal proportional allocation of the Pan-Asian Bond Fund for bonds issued in each local 
market, the allocation for bonds of a given domestic market will be increased over time if 
its “market openness” (as well as other lower-weighted factors) scores better than the 
averages for the other markets. Chart 2, below, shows that such weight adjustments can 
be significant.  
                                                
32  Malaysia, for example, has dismantled many of the restrictions that were introduced during the Asian 
crisis. Other measures have been introduced to reduce tax impediments: five out of eight participating 
countries have so far exempted non-residents investing in domestic sovereign or quasi-sovereign 
issues from withholding tax. 
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Chart 2 
 
 
Last, but not least, the ABF2 initiative showed that central banks can play a useful role in 
spearheading and coordinating regulatory reforms, in particular as bond market 
development did not fall squarely within the mandate of any government agency.33 
The impressive expansion in domestic bond markets since the late 1990s has not only 
allowed governments and other borrowers to fund themselves more efficiently but has 
contributed to the overall stability of domestic financial systems. But these opportunities 
have been offset by a lack of liquidity, which often falls considerably short of that found 
in developed economies. The experience of the Asian Bond Fund 2 demonstrates how 
determined efforts to remove market impediments can achieve very concrete results 
within a surprisingly short time frame. 
 
Benefits of a common hub for coordination – the example of the BIS 
The initiatives described above were all the result of intense dialogue among central 
banks that had been going on over several years. It might have been possible to reach a 
                                                
33  EMEAP, supra, notes 27 and 32. 
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result without a history of cooperation, but it was certainly easier to move forward and to 
reach agreements in a setting in which central banks had built mutual trust and 
knowledge of shared strengths and weaknesses.  
There are various ways, more or less formalised or institutionalised, to build such 
confidence-enhancing structures among central banks. In this context let me point out 
some of the experiences of the BIS, an institution in which central banks have 
cooperated since 1930, which makes it the oldest international financial institution in the 
world. 
Since 2003, the BIS is owned by 55 central banks; among them are 24 non-European 
members and 16 central banks from major emerging market economies. It is financially 
independent, and its governance structure makes it also highly independent from 
political influence. Apart from being a bank for over 120 central banks and some 20 
international organisations, it was designed to act as a forum for international financial 
cooperation, and it is also a renowned centre for monetary and economic studies on 
issues of relevance to central banks. 
The BIS hosts and supports the Secretariat for some expert committees that work in 
areas such as monetary policy, payment systems or banking supervision.34 It is at the 
BIS that the Governors of central banks from major economies meet very two months, 
and central banks from other countries, for instance from the Caribbean, are regularly 
invited to participate in BIS events, held both at the Head Office in Basel as well as in 
the regions. 
The reputation and relative success of the BIS is perhaps based on two noteworthy 
facts. First, it is important to point out that the BIS has no regulatory powers whatsoever, 
and second, that the documents that come out of the BIS or of the various Committees it 
supports are not the result of majority decisions, or voting. Rather, it is the often long 
process of seeking consensus, or simply sharing concerns and insights in an 
atmosphere of trust that results in a high degree of acceptability. 35 
Questions and open issues 
As regards the relevance of the above for a further Caribbean integration, it would 
appear that a consensus on some of the following questions would need to be sought. 
                                                
34  For instance, the BCBS, the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), the Committee on 
Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), the Irving Fisher Committee (IFC), the Markets Committee 
(MC) or the Group of Computer Experts (GCE); see http://www.bis.org for more information. 
Furthermore, the BIS invited the secretariats of more recent, independent, groups of the financial 
regulatory and supervisory community to be located in Basel, such as the Financial Stability Forum 
(http://www.fsforum.org), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (www.iaisweb.org) and 
the International Association of Deposit Insurers (http://www.iadi.org). 
35  See Giovanoli (2000), Heinrich (2006).. 
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Should there be a monetary union at all? 
Obviously, there is no easy answer to this question, and there is no single model of 
monetary cooperation which could be duplicated around the world. But obviously many 
countries are confronted with similar challenges that Europe faced over 15 years ago, in 
particular whether it is possible to reconcile greater economic integration with exchange 
rate volatility, and, if not, whether fixed or pegged exchange rate regimes can be 
sustained in an environment of full capital mobility.36  
It appears that one of the reasons why the original idea as promoted by CARICOM 
heads of state has not yet come to fruition could lie in the fact that, individually taken, the 
economies of CARICOM states are more competitive than complimentary, and that the 
trade potential among them seems to be already exploited; on the other hand, a 
monetary union could provide member states with a collective public good that could be 
a catalyst for further integration.37  
Should central banks share a common institution? 
A major part of the European monetary unification process has had to do with institution 
building. 
If regional central bank cooperation in the Caribbean were to be further institutionalised, 
one can think of several options. A first-step low-key solution could be to create a name 
for the common framework and a Secretariat, but rotate the secretariat among members 
rather than creating a new administrative entity.38 An intermediate step could make use 
of an existing structure or institution whose mandate might need to be expanded,39 and 
probably the most complex option would be to create a new institution which could serve 
as the embryo for a future joint central bank. An example for the latter option is the EMI 
as pathfinder for, and predecessor of, the ECB. 
In any event, one would need to think of whether such an entity could or should become 
a formal CARICOM institution. It appears that at this time the Caribbean Investment 
Bank, created by regional governments in 1969, is the only common financial institution 
of CARICOM. 
                                                
36  Noyer, supra, at note 27. 
37  Manioc and Montauban, supra, footnote 11. On the proposals of the Council of Central Bank 
Governors regarding different options for monetary integration, and on the proposal for a strategy of 
reserves pooling, see Nicholls, Birchwood et.al. (2000). Commitment to a currency board as a 
potentially vital step in achieving a currency union for the Caribbean is supported by Worrell (2003). On 
monetary integration in Africa, see Gudmundsson (2006). 
38  This is the case, for instance, for the Central American Council of Bank Supervisors (“Consejo 
Centroamericano de Supervisores Bancarios). 
39  Existing structures are, for instance, the Caribbean Group of Bank Supervisors (CGBS), or the 
Caribbean Centre for Monetary Studies (CCMS). 
Article manuscript, G Heinrich 15
 
The governance structure of any new institution, the decision making process and the 
ability to speak on behalf of others would of course pose further challenges.40 
Infrastructures: harmonisation of payment system development, supervision, stock 
exchanges  
Independent of the question of a monetary union, a further integration and in particular 
the development of financial markets would appear to require the development or 
strengthening of existing infrastructures, in particular payment and settlement systems, 
and possibly also a common, more formal framework for banking supervision and 
regulation.41  
One could ask whether such development is better achieved if each country works on its 
own, but shares experiences as they move along; or whether the development should 
occur on the basis of common standards and procedures that are to be developed within 
a common central bank infrastructure.42 A common payments infrastructure in an 
integrated economy, with benefits to all users, also at retail level, can however be a long 
process. 43 
 
                                                
40  As regards governance of central banks, the BIS has supported cooperation and information sharing 
among central banks for a number of years, lead by the Central Bank Governance Forum and now 
supported by a new section on “Central Banking Studies” within the Monetary and Economic 
Department of the BIS (2006). 
41  Regional supervisory authorities do cooperate through the Caribbean Group of Bank Supervisors 
(CGBS), established in aegis of the CARICOM Central Bank Governors. For instance, the CGBS 
Technical Working Group has been looking at minimum features for consolidated supervision to be 
embodied in legislation and proposals have been put forward to the Group of CARICOM Central Bank 
Governors; see Anderson (2007). While the CGBS has a central website, http://www.cgbsnet.org/, and 
since 2003 a group within Bank of Jamaica has been administering the Secretariat for CGBS, the 
Group of Governors does not appear to have a central hub, a website or joint publications. Individual 
Caribbean authorities are, however, members in ASBA, the Association of Supervisors of Banks of the 
Americas, www.asbaweb.org. 
42  One needs to distinguish between agreeing to follow general basic principles and agreeing on common 
technical standards, legal principles and perhaps even one or more technical platform to be shared by 
all. As regards basic principles, see CPSS (2001) and (2006). On legal harmonisation, see Heinrich 
(February 2006). 
43  Note, however, that while TARGET has been successfully operating as platform for settlements in 
central bank money in Europe, the realisation of the “Single euro Payments Area” (SEPA) as “a means 
to advance European integration with a competitive and innovative euro area retail payments market 
that can bring with it higher service levels, more efficient products and cheaper alternatives for making 
payments”, began in the 1990s and is still not finalised. See: 
http://www.ecb.int/paym/pol/sepa/html/index.en.html 
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Should there be first movers to a monetary union? 
If monetary union is to take shape, one would probably need to think about whether all 
countries are to join such a union at the same time, or if there could be a group of “first 
movers” which would build a core group. In Europe, as you know, not all members of the 
European Community have already adopted the euro. Some have decided not to adopt 
that common currency for the time being; others are working towards joining the 
eurozone but do not yet fulfil the necessary preconditions as set out in the convergence 
criteria.44 For the Caribbean, one would need to think whether to create a new currency 
area or to expand existing ones, ie to continue with CARICOM’s original plan to have 
regional countries join the ECCB45, or to see first how sub regional initiatives for 
economic union, like for instance for the OECS46, progress. 
It is on all these issues that joint work and a common understanding by central banks 
could provide essential guidance to politicians on the best way forward. 
 
                                                
44  The Czech Republic, for instance, plans to adopt the euro by 2010 and is confident to fulfil all the 
convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty related to price stability, long-term interest rates and 
fiscal positions, government debt and exchange rate conversion; www.czech.cz/en/economy-business-
science/   
45  Supra, note 12. 
46  Seven of the nine member states of the OECS i.e. Antigua and Barbuda , Dominica , Grenada , 
Montserrat, St.Kitts and Nevis, St.Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines are participating in the 
economic union initiative that started in 2001. Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands the two remaining 
member states have requested time for further consideration. See www.oecs.org. 
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Table 1 
Monetary policy framework 
 Exchange rate anchor 
 Dollarised1 Currency 
board 
Fixed 
pegs 
Crawling 
pegs 
Monetary 
aggregate 
Inflation 
target 
IMF 
supported or 
other 
mon.progr.2 
Caribbean        
Aruba   x     
Bahamas   x     
Barbados   x     
Dominican 
Republic 
      x 
ECCU  x      
Haiti       x 
Jamaica     x   
Trinidad& 
Tobago 
      x 
Brit.Virgin 
Islamds 
x       
Central 
America 
       
Belize   x     
Costa Rica    x    
El Salvador x       
Guatemala      x  
Honduras    x    
Nicaragua    x    
Panama x       
1) A foreign currency is legal tender; 2) May imply floors for international reserves and ceilings for the central 
bank’s net domestic assets, and consequently also indicative targets fro reserve money. 
Source: IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 2005. 
 
